Reflections on the Antecedents to the Fukushima Disaster in 2011

The Fukoshima “triple disaster” in 2011 was caused by an earthquake that triggered a tsunami, which then hit nuclear power stations situated on the East Coast of Japan. This resulted in large quantities of radioactivity released into the natural environment, and more than 300,000 residents evacuated as well as a cleanup operation that may take decades and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. (Reconstruction Unit Secretariat, 2012). Prior to the disaster, post-WW2, Japan had pushed to become energy independent, rather than historically reliant on energy imports, particularly from the Middle East (World Nuclear Association, 2023). This resulted in great political and commercial pressure to fund and build nuclear plants, further enhanced by the 1992 Kyoto protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

 

In 2007, Katsuhiko Ishibashi wrote an article titled “Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk From Quake Damage”, highlighting the damage caused to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power plant operated by Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) as a result of an earthquake. Ishibashi even included a map, showing the two Fukushima plants and highlighting their vulnerability, positioned in areas of seismic instability: “…the guidelines should require that a nuclear power plant, no matter where it is located, should be designed to withstand at least the ground acceleration caused by an earthquake of about a 7.3 magnitude, roughly 1000 gal. In fact, however, the new guidelines require only about 450 gal.” (Ishibashi, 2007) The Chairman of Japan’s nuclear Safety Commission at the time, Haruki Madarame, dismissed Ishibashi’s claims because he was a “nobody”. (Clenfield, 2011)


Map showing location of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant. Ishibashi, 2011.

The Fukushima disaster could have been prevented. Ishibashi was acting as a people-centred Early Warning System, and yet, due to political pressures plus a fracture between academia, and industry and government, (Edmondson, 2018) he was dismissed as a “nobody” and his early warnings of a major disaster were not heeded.

 

The same dynamics unfold in the case of the flash floods that occurred in Chamoli District in India in February 2021, which Chandi Prasad Bhatt had warned of in essays written over the 1980’s, 1990’s, and 2000s (Guha, 2021). As Guha points out, decisions regarding where, what, and how to build infrastructure and housing should “involve the best scientists in the country” and be decoupled from political pressures and incentives that can hamper decision making.

 

References: 

 

Clenfield, J. 2011. Nuclear Regulator Dismissed Seismologist on Japan Quake Threat

Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-21/nuclear-regulator-dismissed-seismologist-on-japan-quake-threat?leadSource=uverify%20wall#xj4y7vzkg (Accessed: 27 February 2023).

 

Edmondson, Amy C. The Fearless Organization: Creating Psychological Safety in the Workplace for Learning, Innovation, and Growth. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018.

 

Guha, R. 2021. 6 lessons from a Himalayan tragedy. https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/6-lessons-from-a-himalayan-tragedy-by-ramachandra-guha-2365783 (Accessed: 27 February 2023).

 

Ishibashi, K., 2007. Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk From Quake Damage. International Herald Tribune, 11.

 

Nuclear Power in Japan | Japanese Nuclear Energy – World Nuclear Association . (2023). Retrieved 27 February 2023, from https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx

Reconstruction Unit Secretariat, “Report on the Number of Evacuees Across the Country, Prefectural and Other Refugees,” February 1, 2012, (2023). Retrieved 27 February 2023, from https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20120201zenkoku-hinansyasu.pdf

Preparedness and Disaster

Drawing on the lecture contents, share one example of a real-world disaster caused by people’s under- or unpreparedness. Consider both behavioural and systemic/structural causes for under or unpreparedness.

 

On april 26, 1986, the RBMK-1000 reactor at Chernobyl suffered a series of catastrophic failures that resulted in core meltdown. The RBMK type of reactor was inherently unsafe compared to most reactors used in Europe and the USA, partly because of a lack of concrete reactor shielding and partly due to the use of cheaper and more powerful graphite as a moderator instead of water (IAEA, 1992). The Soviet government at the time maintained that nuclear power was perfectly safe, despite multiple previous nuclear power incidents in the country, and that accidents were unlikely to the point of impossible (Plokhy, 2018). This stance led to a lack of safety protocols and a belief that spending extra money to build concrete shielding for the reactor in case of a meltdown was unnecessarily wasteful.

 

After the explosions at the plant, government officials, afraid of contradicting their superiors in the party, resisted calling for evacuation of local towns for many hours and days. In the nearby town of Kharkov, the International Workers’ Day parade took place on May 1, 1986 despite radiation levels many times the levels required to trigger evacuation (Ervasti, 1986).

 

Radiation is invisible, and that combined with government assurances that nuclear power was perfectly safe, meant that people in Chernobyl and surrounding towns did not prepare for such an eventuality. When the disaster occurred, some people were even found to be sunbathing, having discovered that they tanned quickly (not realising that the “tan” was in fact deadly radiation burns) (BBC, 2019).

 

Even emergency responders such as firefighters and the military, did not appreciate the seriousness of heavy doses of radiation, and were seen picking up bits of graphite from the reactor that had been thrown into the air by the explosion (Alexakhin, et al. 2006). For some people involved in the response, their belief that nuclear power was safe was so strong as to dismiss any safety concerns, due to the edicts issued by the Soviet government.

 

People are less likely to prepare for a disaster in high compliance cultures where authorities dismiss concerns and overstate safety, and radiation, being an invisible threat, compounds the issue.

 

Share one example of disaster risk reduction alternative that has either improved or has the potential to improve people’s preparedness. Consider both potential and limitations of such alternative.

 

In Bangladesh, an approach of community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) has been implemented in response to the threat of floods and cyclones. (ADPC, 2008) This involves local communities in identifying and assessing their own disaster risks, developing preparedness and response plans, and implementing risk reduction measures. The program in Chittagong  involves training community members in disaster risk reduction techniques, including early warning, evacuation, and first aid. Community members are also involved in the planning and implementation of disaster risk reduction measures, such as building raised platforms for homes and livestock, constructing flood shelters, and planting trees to prevent erosion.

 

Through this program, communities have become more resilient to disasters, and have been able to reduce the impact of floods and cyclones on their homes, crops, and livelihoods. Additionally, the program has empowered local communities to take ownership of their own disaster risk reduction efforts and has improved communication and coordination between community members and local authorities (Shaw, 2006).

 

CBDRM programs may not always involve all members of the community equally however. Some groups, such as women, children, and people with disabilities, may be excluded from planning and implementation, which can lead to unequal distribution of resources and a lack of representation in decision-making. A lack of technical expertise can also hamper the effectiveness of CBDRM programs and may result in inadequate or ineffective disaster risk reduction measures (Nguyen et al, 2020).

 

Word count: 615

 

References

 

ADPC, 2008. “Community Empowerment and Disaster Risk Reduction in Chittagong City” Safer Cities 21. Available at: https://www.preventionweb.net/files/globalplatform/entry_bg_paper~SaferCities21.pdf (Accessed: 13 March 2023).

 

Shaw, R., 2006. Critical issues of community based flood mitigation: examples from Bangladesh and Vietnam. Science and Culture, 72(1/2), p.62.

 

“INSAG-7: The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1” (PDF). IAEA. 1992. Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 October 2018. Available at: https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf (Accessed: 13 March 2023).

 

Plokhy, S. (2018). Chernobyl: the history of a nuclear catastrophe. First edition. New York, Basic Books.

 

Ervasti, R, (1986) Soviets Celebrate May Day, No Mention of Nuclear Accident With AM-May Day. AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/595cefb4d64896ee1a422caa6c1b88d2 (Accessed: 13 March 2023).

 

The Aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl Disaster: An Eyewitness Account | BBC HistoryExtra (2019). Available at: https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/chernobyl-disaster-ukraine-when-what-first-responders-diary-eyewitness-nuclear-exclusion-zone/ (Accessed: 13 March 2023).

 

Alexakhin, R.M. et al. (2006). Environmental consequences of the Chernobyl accident and their remediation: Twenty years of experience. Report of the Chernobyl Forum Expert group “Environment”.

 

Nguyen, H., Pross, C., Han, J Y-C. (2020). (Ed) Perkins, M. Review of gender-responsiveness and disability-inclusion in disaster risk reduction in Asia and the Pacific. UN Women-Asia and the Pacific. https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/10/ap-review-of-gender-responsiveness-and-disability-inclusion-in-drr

Resilience and Disaster Response and Recovery

  1. Alexander (2013, p.2714) argues “resilience has a bright future ahead of it as an explanatory concept in various allied fields that deal with environmental extremes. However, its success in this respect will depend on not overworking it or expecting that it can provide more insight and greater modeling capacity than it is capable of furnishing.” In the context of DRR, do you agree with this statement? Provide reasons for why/why not.

 

Resilience is not a panacea for all the challenges facing DRR. Resilience may be misinterpreted to mean robustness: simply sustaining functions despite challenges, whilst true resilience is “The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions.” (Hollnagel et al, 2006) Rather than treat resilience as a model, we must treat resilience as an activity, and make clear the distinction between active resilience and passive robustness. 

 

The scholar Nassim Taleb, in his book “Antifragile” notoriously misinterpreted resilience: “Antifragility is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better.” (Taleb, 2013) It is clearly an easily misinterpreted and misunderstood concept.

 

Additionally, as Cretney (2014) argues, there is a danger that resilience can become a tool for the perpetuation of inequalities and injustices. We must question for whom resilience is being built and who benefits from it most.

 

  1. Given the range of vulnerabilities associated with New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina (2005), as outlined by Laska and Morrow (2006), suggest THREE disaster preparedness measures or initiatives that could serve to reduce some of these vulnerabilities.

 

Applying the concept of multi-layer safety (MLS) by Esteban et al, we can highlight three disaster preparedness elements that may have served to reduce some of the vulnerabilities highlighted by Laska and Morrow (2006) are:

 

  1. Primary layer: Hurricane Katrina highlighted the importance of adequate infrastructure in reducing both the likelihood and the severity of flooding. This includes improved infrastructure, such as stronger levees and better drainage systems, to reduce the likelihood of future floods.
  2. Secondary layer: During Hurricane Katrina, communication between emergency responders, local officials, and the public was limited, leading to confusion and delays in response. These gaps in emergency response planning demonstrated the need for effective early warning systems. The appropriate measures include developing a comprehensive early warning system and up to date evacuation plans.
  3. The Tertiary layer regards recovery and restoration after a disaster. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, better involvement of the local community in planning for a disaster, and responding to it afterwards would improve the effectiveness of recovery programmes. 

 

  1. Given the many and varied critiques and limitations of the resilience concept (e.g. as presented in Cretney 2014), why do you think resilience persists as a central element and goal of DRR strategies?

 

Resilience is about what a system can do — including its capacity: 

 

  • to anticipate — seeing developing signs of trouble ahead to begin to adapt early and reduce the risk of decompensation 
  • to synchronize —  adjusting how different roles at different levels coordinate their activities to keep pace with tempo of events and reduce the risk of working at cross purposes 
  • to be ready to respond — developing deployable and mobilizable response capabilities in advance of surprises and reduce the risk of brittleness 
  • for proactive learning — learning about brittleness and sources of resilient performance before major collapses or accidents occur by studying how surprises are caught and resolved 

 

(From Woods, 2018.) As Woods states, resilience is a verb. There are many aspects of resilience, but the key point of adapting and improving is vital. DRR is an active process, it is a verb, just like resilience. DRR exists to serve people, and the adaptable element of resilience is people: it is only people who can adapt, learn, and improve (Geraghty, 2020), which is why resilience persists as a central tenet of DRR.

 

References:

 

Cretney, R. 2014. Resilience for whom? Emerging critical geographies of socio-ecological resilience. Geography Compass, 8 (9): 627–40.

 

Esteban, M. et al (2013). Recent tsunamis events and preparedness: Development of Tsunami Awareness in Indonesia, Chile and Japan, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. Elsevier. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221242091300037X (Accessed: February 16, 2023).

 

Resilience Engineering and DevOps – A Deeper Dive | Tom Geraghty (2020). Available at: https://tomgeraghty.co.uk/index.php/resilience-engineering-and-devops/ (Accessed: 16 February 2023).

 

Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. & Leveson, N. C. (Eds.) (2006). Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

 

Laska, S., and Morrow, B. H. (2006). Social vulnerabilities and Hurricane Katrina: an unnatural disaster in New Orleans. Marine technology society journal, 40(4), 16-26.

 

Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2013. Antifragile. Harlow, England: Penguin Books.

 

Woods, D.D., 2018. Resilience is a verb. Domains of resilience for complex interconnected systems., p.167.

 

Nottingham University Hospitals Maternity Services – Home Birth Risk Assessment

In December 2022 I requested a copy of the NUH Trust’s risk assessment and associated decision making evidence showing how the restriction to women’s individual rights and the benefits to home birth, in terms of clinical outcomes, was weighed up against other safety concerns to come to a decision not to provide a full time home birth team.

In April 2023 they responded with the attached NUH maternity home birth risk assessment document.

 

Leadership vs Management

management and leadership

Or is it Leadership *and* Management?

 

Tom Geraghty
Speaking at CIO Event in London, 2019

I created this graphic in 2019 as part of a presentation on High Performing Teams for the IT Leaders Conference.

management and leadership

Inspired by Grace Hopper’s “You manage things, you lead people” quote, I wanted to make the point that great leadership also requires great management skills. You can be a great manager of things without leadership skills, but you can’t be a great leader without good management skills. Without those management skills, you may be able to lead people, but your lack of direction, effectiveness, and capability could lead to failure.

You manage things, you lead people" quote by grace hopper

Sometimes management and leadership are presented as a binary, or worse, that “management” is bad and “leadership” is good. Neither is true: we should resist “leaderism“, and instead concentrate on the actual capabilities and skills required to manage things, and lead people. Both can be learned, taught, and always improved. We dive into this much deeper over at psychsafety.com, where we examine the capabilities and skills required for both excellent management and leadership.

tom geraghty psychological safety

(Since 2019, this graphic has gone a bit viral on LinkedIn, Chegg, Twitter and elsewhere!)

The fabulous Elita Silva translated the management and leadership graphic into Portuguese!

management and leadership - Portuguese

 

And the fabulous Ana Aneiros Vivas has translated it into Spanish!

Spanish-version-of-Management-and-leadership

Filippo Poletti translated it into Italian!

management and leadership in Italian

 

And the folk at Solutions and Performances – Executive Search have translated it into French!